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Humanitarian Organizations Information Practices: 
procedures and privacy concerns for serving the 
Undocumented 
1. Introduction  
 
Many organizations in the United States engage with undocumented individuals 
to help them secure the legal counseling, social services, and educational assistance 
that might otherwise be unattainable (Immigration Advocates Network & Idealware, 
2016). Undocumented migrants in the country face a constant fear of detention and 
deportation, which causes them to feel insecure, transient and impermanent in the 
daily lives (Gomez & Vannini, 2017; Gómez & Vannini, 2015; Vannini, Gomez, & 
Guajardo, 2016). What efforts humanitarian organizations are making to protect the 
personal information of the individuals they serve have, however, been little investi-
gated (see: Vannini, Gomez, & Newell, 2019). While recent developments in infor-
mation technology alone would call for an evaluation of current information systems 
and practices, the need for such an evaluation is made more urgent by the current 
political climate in the United States. Undocumented youth who had previously seen a 
path to citizenship through the DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) pro-
gram created by executive order under Obama now fear that they may be targets for 
deportation under Trump, who ended the program in September of 2017 and has 
called on Congress to draft new immigration legislation (National Immigration Law 
Center, 2017a). Under the current presidency, the number of ICE (Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement) officers has also tripled, the targets for deportation have ex-
panded, and an end to federal funding for sanctuary cities (local administrations that 
do not collaborate with the federal administration to denounce and deport undocu-
mented individuals) has been called for (National Immigration Law Center, 2017b). 
Because of these changes, the legal and social services offered by humanitarian in-
formation organizations have taken on greater importance in the lives of the undocu-
mented, as has the obligation of these organizations to protect the privacy of the vul-
nerable populations they serve. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Undocumented migrants in the United States experience complex relations with 
privacy, security and social activism, as their Information behaviors are mediated by 
the constant fear of detention and deportation in their daily lives (Vannini et al., 
2016). In this study, we focus on humanitarian organizations that work with the un-
documented in the country, and we aim to identify the information systems and prac-
tices currently used by these organizations to assess how they protect the privacy of 
the people they aim to serve.  
Our interviews and document analyses were informed by several studies that are 
more technical or prescriptive in nature. First are two sets of guidelines, one by Colli-
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er (Collier, 2017) and a second by Raymond (Raymond, Al Achkar, Verhulst, Berens, 
& Barajas, 2016), that suggest specific approaches to institutional audits of infor-
mation systems and practices. In response to the crisis faced by many of our students 
[who] are at risk of deportation, of brutality, of harassment, Collier urges academic 
institutions to restyle themselves as digital sanctuaries for student data, retaining as 
little information as possible on students, having clear protocols and training for the 
storage and sharing of data, and reconsidering the necessity of using third-party ven-
dors such as providers of online course interfaces and the plagiarism detection service 
Turnitin (Collier, 2017). Raymond (Raymond et al., 2016) proposes a four-step pro-
cess for information security audits by humanitarian organizations, briefly, evaluating 
the purpose for which data is generated and shared, taking inventory of the data, iden-
tifying risks, and developing strategies to minimize those risks. A wide-ranging study 
of technical developments in information security by Olijnyk (Olijnyk, 2015) identi-
fies multiple sub-disciplines of the field, such as communication security, data securi-
ty, and network security, and provides a bibliography for further research on each. 
Next are two articles that stress the continued importance of human interactions, real 
or virtual, in protecting the undocumented, and situations where low-tech methods of 
information management might actually be more secure. Both of these articles also 
stress the importance of training volunteers on the necessity of maintaining the priva-
cy of the vulnerable populations they are trying to help (Cardia, Holzer, Xu, Maitland, 
& Gillet, 2017; Newell, Gomez, & Guajardo, 2016). Finally, a 2016 survey of immi-
grant rights organizations information technology practices reveals several common 
weaknesses, particularly in the areas of data backup and password protocols (Immi-
gration Advocates Network & Idealware, 2016). 
Some undocumented individuals first experience the limits of their status as they 
enter higher education, an encounter made particularly challenging by the patchwork 
of federal and state regulations and institutional policies on admissions and financial 
aid for the undocumented (Gildersleeve, Rumann, & Mondragón, 2010). Since they 
are likely to be low-income, the first in their families to attend college, and at a higher 
risk for health and anxiety issues, these students typically require specialized assis-
tance from multiple university departments, and will have to weigh the risks of re-
vealing their status at each point of contact (Gildersleeve et al., 2010; Mendoza, 
2016). If, through ignorance, indifference, or personal bias, administrators provide 
false or conflicting information or pass difficult questions off to other departments, 
the undocumented students trust in the institution will be compromised, and his or 
her chances of academic success will be greatly reduced (Mangan, 2017; Mendoza, 
2016). University staff who instead are trained to provide consistent and accurate 
information to the undocumented while maintaining their confidentiality can trans-
form each disclosure of status into an empowering experience, a way for the undocu-
mented to gain confidence and hope for the future after years of secrecy and mistrust 
(Muñoz, 2016). 
The range of outcomes experienced by undocumented students in higher educa-
tion is just one demonstration of the importance of uniform training of staff at all 
organizations that work with the undocumented, an idea that is born out in the litera-
ture. Researchers have shown the improved client outcomes provided by consistent 
training in social sensitivity (Ferguson, 2006; Mendoza, 2016), academic and legal 
advising (Gildersleeve et al., 2010; Mangan, 2017; Muñoz, 2016; Olivas, 2010), and 
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access to social services (Muhren, Eede, & Walle, 2009; Norris-Tirrell, 2014). In 
recent years, the particular importance training staff on the safe handling of sensitive 
client data has become a theme among researchers (Collier, 2017; Ferguson, 2006; 
Hollenhorst, 2017; Ritvo, 2016); it is possible that this trend has been brought about 
by the rapid development of new data management and communication technologies 
and the changing political climate. 
An alternate response to the complications introduced by changing technologies 
and the new political climate is the idea of privacy self-management, allowing the 
undocumented to manage their own data and disclosure of immigration status 
(Solove, 2013). Out of confusion, overwork, or respect for client autonomy, staff at 
humanitarian organizations might leave privacy decisions to the undocumented. 
However, as Solove claims, the consent of the individual is insufficient in the age of 
big data, as it is not really possible for ones consent to truly be informed when the 
individual can no longer recognize and anticipate all the ways ones data might be 
shared and used by others (Solove, 2013). Even more when they are a particularly 
vulnerable population (Eubanks, 2018; Marwick & Boyd, 2018). It is therefore the 
responsibility of humanitarian organizations to advise the undocumented on the most 
cautious approach to personal information management.  
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
In this study, we were guided by two main research questions: 
1. What are the information practices and systems employed by humanitarian 
organizations to protect the privacy of the undocumented individuals they 
serve?  
2. How are they following legal standards and best technological practices re-
garding migrants data privacy and security? 
 
From the outset we sought to include a variety of organizations in our study from 
the US West Coast (States of California, Oregon and Washington), where the authors 
have established ties. We recognized that the needs of the undocumented change as 
they navigate the different legal, social service, and academic systems in the Ameri-
can society. Thus, we chose to focus on organizations that provide legal and academic 
services to migrants in the area with whom two of the authors had already established 
trust relationships in the previous years. We chose to work with four advocacy 
groups, the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (NWIRP), the largest nonprofit im-
migrant rights organization focusing on  low-income clients in the United States;  
Immigration Counseling Service (ICS), a nonprofit organization that provides easy 
access and affordable immigration legal services for immigrant communities in Ore-
gon and Southwest Washington; the Washington Immigrants Solidarity Network 
(WAISN), an all-volunteer coalition of groups specializing in assistance to immi-
grants in the areas of education, labor, and social services, and providing tools for 
immediate reporting of and response to ICE activity in Washington; and El Rescate, a 
Los Angeles, California, based nonprofit organization that serves immigrants, in par-
ticular Latinos,  in an effort  to improve their political and economic status by provid-
ing legal and financial services and through community outreach. We also focused on 
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three organizations with ties to higher education, the admissions department at Seattle 
Central College and two groups at the University of Washington: the Samuel E. Kelly 
Ethnic Cultural Center (ECC) within the Office of Minority Affairs and Diversity; 
and Leadership Without Borders (LWB), a peer support group moderated by a univer-
sity employee whose membership is limited to undocumented students. 
Since our organizations were different in the work they are performing with un-
documented migrants, two interview guides were written. For the five organizations 
that require some amount of personal information from the undocumented in order to 
provide assistance (NWIRP, ICS, WAISN, El Rescate, and Seattle Central College 
admissions), our questions focused on the systems and practices used to gather, store, 
and share that sensitive data. The two university support groups (ECC and LWB), 
instead, are outreach organizations that share information with their members and 
provide them with real and virtual social spaces; our interview questions for these two 
groups focused instead on the systems and practices (primarily Facebook) used to 
facilitate communication with and among the undocumented. We interviewed five 
staff members from the four advocacy groups, and four staff members from the two 
higher education institutions, for a total of nine interviews. The position of each inter-
viewee was different in each organization, including executive directors, lawyers, 
technology directors, advocates and coordinators. Furthermore, a documents analysis 
was performed on admissions and enrollment forms, flyers, web sites, videos, online 
forms, and organizations social media pages, with the aim to complement the data 
collected via the interviews. 
 
4. Findings  
 
4.1. Information systems and methods 
 
In order to carry out their work, the nonprofit service organizations and the com-
munity college admissions department we investigated need to collect, filter, process, 
and share the personal information of their undocumented clients. We discovered that 
both paper and electronic forms and data storage methods were used by these organi-
zations, as determined by client preferences, available technologies, and staff exper-
tise. The peer support organizations at the University of Washington also use both 
paper and electronic systems to inform undocumented students of educational and 
social events. Usually general announcements appear on the public Facebook pages, 
while more specific event information, including the time and place of events, is con-
veyed through physical flyers posted in the more protected environment of the ECC.  
The all-volunteer coalition WAISN exists primarily to facilitate monitoring and 
quick responses to ICE activity. The only client information the organization requires 
to carry out this service is phone numbers, which are stored on a listserv. Anytime 
ICE activity is reported and confirmed on the WAISN hotline, the location of the 
activity is announced to every number on the listserv. Organizations such as NWIRP, 
ICS, and El Rescate, however, need to maintain detailed files on their undocumented 
clients in order to help them manage their immigration cases. Collecting and storing 
personal information including employment and birth records on undocumented indi-
viduals applying for legal status or fighting deportation requires a high standard accu-
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racy, completeness, and protection, usually achieved using both paper and electronic 
files. At ICS, potential clients fill out a paper intake form to determine if they might 
be eligible for services. If an individuals case is accepted, the information is then 
entered into a database. If a case is not accepted, the intake form is shredded.   
Many non-profit humanitarian organizations rely on databases run by groups out-
side of their organization to store client data securely. ICS uses a database called In-
novation Law Lab, which is provided to them for free due to their nonprofit status by 
the Immigrant Law Group. Law Lab is a cloud-based case management software that 
was designed by immigration lawyers for immigration lawyers, and therefore it is a 
client-focused, data-driven case management software. This database stores encrypted 
data in servers and allows for its secure transmission. Documents are made accessible 
anywhere there is an internet connection, eliminating the need for retaining duplicate 
paper records (https://innovationlawlab.org/blog/2017/07/05/why-innovation-law-lab-
software-is-a-necessity-for-your-firm).  
NWIRP uses a database called LegalServer. LegalServer is a web-based content 
management system that does not require any software installation. It provides secure 
remote access via the Internet and is accessible through standard internet browsers. 
LegalServer has its own team of database engineers, support staff and IT managers to 
assist the agencies it serves. Its users from within the legal system vary and include 
legal aid agencies, pro bono agencies, law schools, and immigration clinics, funding 
agencies, and public defenders (https://www.legalserver.org/features).   
In both these cases, the outside group is responsible for updating the system and 
addressing any security problems that may arise. Other organizations, like El Rescate, 
use internally managed databases to store client information.  
In addition to electronic files, the organizations maintain physical files for each 
client where they collect documents relevant to the clients immigration case, such as 
birth certificates, passports, court records, and medical records.  At NWIRP, these 
documents are scanned into the electronic database when an application is sent to 
immigration.  
The legal professional we interviewed expressed the importance of having case 
information both electronically and physically. According to one of the legal advocate 
interviewed, its good to have information both electronically and in a file... if the 
servers down, we have a copy available... or if we have the actual electronic copy 
and we cant find the paper copy, then its very useful to have it in both places. One 
of the lawyers also stated that though it would be helpful for her work to move to an 
all-electronic system, there are certain advantages to the paper file that would make 
this change difficult:  
I would like to go to all to like electronic [system] where we scan things in, then 
everythings in one place, but . . . I think that theres some kind of reluctance to 
do that because its so hard to be sure [that the system hasnt been breached] with 
the electronic . . . I think for clients, most of [them] arent computer literate or 
comfortable with computers at all, so I think they like to see the physical pa-
perwork. 
 
Though an electronic system of data management might be more efficient for legal 
professionals, it is important to consider the ways in which clients perceive paper 
versus electronic methods. Undocumented individuals approaching humanitarian 
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organizations for assistance already sense themselves to be at risk. If their mistrust of 
technology makes them less willing to be forthcoming with personal information, the 
legal aid worker might not be able to obtain all the information needed to help the 
client.  
 
4.2. Application of legal standards for privacy and protection  
 
Legal standards play a key role in protecting the information of undocumented 
individuals within organizations and institutions. In legal organizations, these stand-
ards include the principle of attorney-client privilege, or the protection for lawyers 
from sharing sensitive information given to them by a client.  The executive director 
of one of the organizations interviewed, shared: 
Even if the government tried to subpoena information from us, because of the 
strength of the attorney-client privilege weve been generally able to fight off any 
attempts or threats of obtaining information about our clients. So we are able to 
reassure people about that and that obviously helps to . . . make sure people will 
share information with us.  
 
This principle plays a key part in both keeping client information secure and ensur-
ing that clients feel safe sharing with the organizations. Additionally, legal organiza-
tions must receive the consent of the client before sharing their information with a 
third party, and might be sanctioned if they violate these standards. One of the law-
yers shared they often reassure clients by informing them of measures they can take if 
their confidentiality is not respected:  
I explain to them that if they ever find out that I gave their information to some-
body without their permission, that they can call this number and someone from 
the state will come out and investigate me. And that I can be punished for doing 
that.  
 
Informing clients of their rights helps to establish a relationship of trust between 
the undocumented clients and the organization. When individuals know that their 
information is legally protected, they are often more willing to reveal sensitive infor-
mation that could be important for their immigration case: [Our clients] are able to 
provide information freely, because they trust that were not going to share that in-
formation without their consent.  
Academic institutions are bound by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act (FERPA), a law that safeguards student records. According to Seattle Community 
College Dreamers Support Navigator, This law protects students because the institu-
tion can't share their private information, like the student's records. For them, 
FERPA is crucial to safeguarding the personal information of undocumented individ-
uals collected by the college. 
 
4.3.  Leveraging technology for information security protection  
 
All of the organizations we investigated leverage technology to protect the in-
formation of undocumented individuals. Currently, these measures include the use of 
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internal databases and listservs, data encryption, and several forms of electronic 
communication that are seen to have different levels of confidentiality.        
WAISN uses encryption to ensure that the text messages sent over their reporting 
hotline and alert system are readable only by members of the listserv. WAISN tech-
nology team lead explains, We do basic encryption,  we collect information 
through our hotlines between a SSL [Secure Sockets Layer] website and the login 
page. 
NWIRP uses a web-based platform, LegalServer, to store client data, such as 
documents, forms that have been submitted to government agencies, and emails. This 
system is seen as an electronic backup to paper files. According to one of the legal 
advocate at the organization: 
Whenever we submit [documents] to immigration, we scan everything into Le-
galServer, . . . in case the file is destroyed--you never know, like in a fire or 
whatever--so whatever happens we have it electronically as well. 
 
This method allows for a secure transfer of information from the login screen into a 
remote server and database. The ECC leverages technology to safeguard the privacy 
of undocumented students who attend the many social and educational events at the 
Center. These events are open to all UW students and are widely photographed, the 
photos posted to Facebook, and attendees tagged by their friends, posing a security 
risk to undocumented students. The organization does have a low-tech method of 
helping the undocumented students avoid camerasthey are encouraged to wear 
large stickers as signal that they wish not to be photographedbut this system is, of 
course, not foolproof. As a safer method of preventing undocumented students from 
being identified on Facebook, the assistant director of the ECC teaches them how to 
adjust their Facebook settings so they cannot be tagged. 
The administrative heads of both the ECC and LWB also leverage the perceived 
enhanced privacy of email, iMessage, and private Facebook groups over the publicly 
accessible Facebook pages. According to the Leadership without Borders coordinator, 
undocumented students most often choose iMessage and a private LWB Facebook 
page to communicate with herself and among each other. The students are not al-
lowed to write posts on the public LWB page, nor are they encouraged to comment on 
the organizations posts. ECC assistant director draws finer distinctions between the 
levels of security of the various forms of electronic communication: 
There are a lot of times we have to reach a lot of students, . . . so [well] try their 
emails, and they wont respond, and then well iMessage them and theyll re-
spond right away Well try to get their attention on iMessage, and then if its 
something a little more sensitive well try to keep it at least--so we have that trail 
on emails, which is more safe . . . Ill tell staff, if you have trouble you can get 
them through iMessage, but bring the conversation back to an email. 
 
Both the interviewees work under the assumption that email represents the highest 
level of privacy, followed by iMessage, private Facebook pages, and public Facebook 
pages. However, according to lawyer and program director of the University of Wash-
ington Tech Policy Lab, the encryption protocols for iMessage do not preclude Apple 
from reading the content of these communications, and the company would likely 
cooperate with any subpoenas of text messages. Though iMessage privacy is currently 
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being decided in the courts, they do not consider this to be a safe mode of communi-
cation for undocumented students. 
Current technology practice at the organizations we investigated is not without 
weaknesses, but at least one organization, WAISN, is considering options for future 
security enhancements. The Network is might soon move their sensitive data to over-
seas servers, possibly in Vietnam, where information could be stored beyond United 
States government jurisdiction. WAISN was also the only organization we contacted 
that was attempting to formulate strategies against hackers, especially as they begin to 
develop a mobile application for use by the undocumented. The team of volunteers at 
WAISN includes security specialists and hobbyists in technology. These experts are 
being guided by the THREAT model of security assessment, where systems managers 
assume the role of a hacker and try to capture any information that would be valuable 
from the data management system. As a final defense against hackers, WAISN might 
integrate a data kill switch into their data storage system, as a way to prevent the 
theft of information in an emergency situation. 
 
4.4. Privacy self-management  
 
Most of the organizations in our study discussed giving undocumented individu-
als the agency to make their own decision about the privacy of their information. 
Among the legal professionals we spoke to, several highlighted that although the or-
ganizations are the ones that send immigration applications to the government, the 
clients themselves must make the decision about whether or not to share specific in-
formation to the government. They highlighted that their clients can also dictate how 
information is stored within their organizations. When someone is not comfortable 
with their information being stored digitally, she keeps it only in their physical file. 
She also emphasized that the clients have the right to request copies of information 
about their case and store that information as they see fit, although she sometimes has 
concerns about risks they may be taking by inadvertently sharing this information.  
Many of the nonprofit organization Facebook pages leave privacy decisions in 
the hands of the user. For example, in the case of a recent DACA information event at 
NWIRP, individuals had the option of selecting attending or interested, which are 
visible to general Facebook users.  Similarly, individuals can choose to leave personal 
testimonies in the form of reviews on both ICSs and NWIRPs Facebook pages. 
Student groups on the University of Washington Campus also leave many deci-
sions about sharing information to the students themselves. For LWB Coordinator, the 
student groups Facebook page is a place for members to be open about their story as 
undocumented individuals, if they should wish to.  Many students have chosen to 
come out as undocumented on the public Facebook page, posting their pictures, 
names, and personal immigration stories. They explain: 
[The students] have been living with their undocumented status their whole life. 
They understand the risks better than anyone and dont need me telling them 
what they should or shouldnt share. If this is something that is important for 
them to do, for themselves, Im not going to try to stop them. We dont do any 
policing here A few students, a very small number (about 5 to 10 percent), 
choose to take on a more activist role and are open about their status. That is their 
decision to make, I am not going to try to stop them. 
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Though they view Facebook primarily as a platform for activism and peer sup-
port among the undocumented, they take a more protective stance towards the stu-
dents when it comes to malicious comments posted by conservatives and white su-
premacists on the public LWB Facebook page. To avoid upsetting the students, they 
document and immediately delete such instances of hate speech.  
Another example of privacy self-management at UW student organizations is the 
previously mentioned decision by the undocumented to wear stickers at ECC events, 
as a signal to others that they do not wish to be photographed.  
  
4.5 Uniform privacy standards and training (or lack thereof) 
 
Overall, of the nonprofits we interviewed none discussed a concrete set of infor-
mation privacy standards or training provided to staff. For NWIRP legal advocate, 
privacy training in her office is more as you go-- you just ask questions. They recall 
learning about certain practices like shredding information when it is no longer need-
ed and keeping information confidential as some of the first standards she learned. 
The executive director of NWIRP stated that his recent privacy training is done 
through the requirements for grant making. Although one of the attorneys interviewed 
did not receive privacy training, her organization occasionally asks people to present 
about issues related to privacy as they come up. Some of those interviewed received 
training through other sources. For example, the technology director of WAISN states 
that workplace privacy training assisted him as a volunteer. ICS lead attorney credits 
her knowledge of privacy training to a course she took on privacy law in law school. 
Data security and privacy standards are often left for third-party organizations that run 
the databases, such as LegalServer and the Immigration Law Group. In NWIRPs 
case, an internal IT department also addresses these issues.  
Of the universities we spoke to, both Seattle Community College staff members 
received privacy training on FERPA, while the UW student organization leaders state 
they have received no training on privacy and security. Weve always just erred on 
the side of caution, especially with our students, anyways, states the assistant direc-
tor of the ECC. He attempts to independently stay aware of current trends, discusses 
security strategies with the director of the campus queer student organization (from 
whom he got the idea of the no-photographs stickers), and passes that knowledge on 
to the students who help him manage social media. Similarly, the LWB coordinator 
explains: I have not received any training. In general, I let the students take the lead 
in protecting their own security.   
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This study provides a preliminary understanding into the information practices 
and systems employed by humanitarian organizations to protect the privacy of the 
undocumented individuals they serve. Our research demonstrates gaps between cur-
rent legal standards and best practices in technology found in the literature and the 
day-to-day functioning of these organizations, run as they are by often overworked 
volunteer staff. In response the rapidly changing political climate, some scholars have 
called for the need for security standards at nonprofits that assist the undocumented, 
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and are suggesting approaches to security audits at these humanitarian organizations 
(CHS Alliance, Groupe URD, & The Sphere Project, 2014; Greenwood, Howarth, 
Escudero Pool, Raymond, & Scarnecchia, 2017). This study responds to their call to 
survey current practices and the particular challenges faced by these organizations. 
The staff of both nonprofit organizations and educational institutions spoke ex-
tensively about legal protections such as attorney-client privilege and FERPA, yet we 
found only limited awareness of data security. Additionally, we found very little in 
the way of concrete privacy standards and training, particularly in terms of digital 
privacy. In many cases, organizations are leaving complex, high-stakes decisions 
about the protection of personal information to the vulnerable undocumented individ-
uals themselves. Given that members of this population often lack legal and techno-
logical sophistication, are struggling with poverty and inadequate health care because 
their access to many social services is blocked, and must deal with the fear of deporta-
tion and family separation, it should not be assumed that the they are in a position to 
manage their own privacy. The opinions of legal and information professionals that 
we encountered in the scholarly literature and in the process of conducting this re-
search advise the most cautious approach to privacy management; we therefore be-
lieve humanitarian information organizations should take proactive efforts to protect 
the privacy of their vulnerable clients. 
Our findings demonstrate the importance of providing support to humanitarian 
organizations in further developing standards and training for digital privacy. In many 
cases, these organizations struggle with limited budgets and capacity and would bene-
fit from a set of shared guideline for the particular needs of humanitarian organiza-
tions working with undocumented migrants, which we hope further studies will ad-
dress.  
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